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In this paper, we estimate structural VAR models with contemporaneous restrictions 
based  on  neo-classical  and  Keynesian  theories  to  investigate  whether  the  cause  of 
current account surpluses for East Asian economies is a “saving glut” or undervalued 
currencies. Analytical results show that the major determinant of the current account is 
the real effective exchange rate for all East Asian countries with the exception of China 
for which the major determinant is domestic GDP. Accordingly, the recently requested 
revaluation of the Chinese yuan may not be an effective policy for reducing the Chinese 
current  account  surplus,  and  may  affect  other  Asian  current  accounts.  We  also 
investigate  whether  a  Chinese  currency  revaluation  would  contribute  to  the 
improvement of current account imbalances in East Asia and find that a revaluation 
would improve the current accounts of Japan, Korea, Indonesia, and Thailand. Since 
the trade structures of major East Asian countries are substitutes with that of China, a 
Chinese currency revaluation might not lead to a decrease, rather that an increase, in 
East  Asian  current  account  surpluses.  Coordination  of  currency  policy  among  East 
Asian countries is, therefore, needed to solve the global current account imbalance. 
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Rimini, Italy on August 29-31, 2008. The authors are grateful to participants at the 
Conference for their useful comments. 
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1.    Introduction 
Over  the  last  decade  we  have  witnessed  rising  global imbalances  that  can  be 
characterized by large current account deficits for the U.S. and large current account 
surpluses for most East Asian countries and oil producing nations. Perhaps the most 
influential explanation for the widening U.S. current account deficits is the widening 
productivity gaps between the U.S. and the rest of the world (Hunt and Rebucci, 2005; 
Engel and Rogers, 2006; Chakraborty and Dekle, 2008). The fact that the deficit with 
East Asia is the most rapidly growing component of U.S. current account deficits may 
indicate,  however,  that  Asian  current  account  surpluses  are  an  alternative  cause.   
Indeed, the “global saving glut” explanation expounded by Bernanke (2005) seeks the 
cause of current account deficits outside the U.S. This argument views the excess saving 
of Asian countries, due to increased saving and collapsed investment in the aftermath of 
the financial crisis, as the cause of U.S. current account deficits.1  Figure 1 presents 
evidence that the movements in the U.S. current account deficit have been symmetrical 
with those in the current account surpluses of Japan and East Asia (in terms of GDP).   
China has been accused of exchange rate manipulation by the U.S. government 
and requested both to revalue the Chinese yuan and to shift from a dollar peg system to 
a more flexible exchange rate regime.2  In July of 2005, the Chinese government carried 
out a reform of its exchange rate system that included abandoning the rigid dollar peg 
that had been in place since 1994. The Chinese monetary authority has, however, only 
been revaluing its US dollar rate by 3 to 5% per year and is still stabilizing the value of 
the yuan.3  Over the last few years, the Chinese current account surplus has increased 
substantially and huge foreign reserves have accumulated. The widening trade deficits 
between the U.S. and China since 2001 have led the U.S. government to put even more 
political pressure on the Chinese government with the aim of reducing the U.S. current 
account deficit.4 
                                                   
1  Chinn and Ito (2007) point out that saving per se is not excessive in East Asia and 
rather East Asia has experienced a shortfall in investment. 
2  Goldstein and Lardy (2003) write that China should make a medium-size (15% to 
25%) revaluation of the yuan as the first step. 
3  See Ogawa and Sakane (2006). Goldstein (2007) stresses that even after exchange 
rate reform the Chinese monetary authority has maintained the undervaluation of the 
yuan. 
4  The effect of the Chinese currency adjustment on the U.S. current account deficits is 
inconclusive. Woo and Xiao (2007) point out that appreciation of the Chinese yuan will 
only re-configure the geographical distribution of global imbalances to other East Asian 
countries. It will not eliminate them. On the other hand, Bergsten (2007) stresses that a 
40% appreciation of the Chinese yuan and other East Asian currencies against the US 
dollar would reduce the U.S. current account deficit by about $150 billion per year.   2
The  request  to  revalue  the  Chinese  currency  may,  however,  be  theoretically 
inconsistent with the “saving glut” argument. This argument relies on neo-classical 
economics,  in  which  it  is  not  the  exchange  rate  but  rather  the  saving-investment 
balance that determines current accounts. Therefore, a revaluation of the Chinese yuan 
and other East Asian currencies would not help to reduce the U.S. current account 
deficit. In contrast, the request for a revaluation of East Asian currencies relies on 
Keynesian economics, in which it is not the “saving glut” but currency manipulation or 
undervalued East Asian currencies that would cause the U.S. current account deficit. 
This paper has two objectives. The first is to investigate whether the request for a 
currency revaluation contributes to improvements in the U.S. current account. In doing 
so, we estimate structural vector autoregressive (VAR) models with contemporaneous 
restrictions based on neo-classical and Keynesian theories to assess whether the main 
determinant of the current account for each of the East Asian countries is GDP or the 
real effective exchange rate. 
The second objective is to examine whether a revaluation of the Chinese yuan 
would improve current account imbalances in East Asia. This link depends on whether 
the trade structures between China and other East Asian countries are substitutes or 
complements. If they are substitutes, a revaluation of the Chinese yuan will improve 
the  current  accounts  of  other  East  Asian  countries.  In  this  case  other  East  Asian 
currencies should also be revalued or allowed to appreciate, in addition to the Chinese 
yuan, in order to reduce global current account imbalances. On the other hand, if trade 
structures are complementary, a revaluation of the Chinese yuan will deteriorate the 
current  accounts  of  other  East  Asian  countries.  It  is  going  to  far  to  say  that  a 
revaluation of the Chinese yuan alone would be enough to solve global current account 
imbalances. We analyze the effects of the real effective exchange rate for the Chinese 
yuan on the current accounts of East Asian countries. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section explains current 
account models developed from the neo-classical and Keynesian frameworks. In the 
third  section,  we  describe  two  structural  VAR  models  with  contemporaneous 
restrictions that correspond to the above two theories. We also present the empirical 
results  for  impulse  response  functions  and  variance  decompositions.  In  the  fourth 
section,  both  three-variable  and  five-variable  VAR  models  are  used  to  analyze  the 
effects  of  a  Chinese  yuan  revaluation  on  the  current  accounts  of  other  East  Asian 
countries. In the conclusion, we summarize our analytical results and discuss several 
policy implications that are implied by the results.   
   3
 
2.  Current Account Models for East Asian Countries 
In this section, we explain two simple models of current account determination, 
based on which we impose contemporaneous restrictions on the structural VAR models 
introduced in the following sections. 
Here, we use the standard IS balance models of the neo-classical and Keynesian 
frameworks.  The  neo-classical  theory  assumes  that  prices  are  flexible,  while  the 
Keynesian  theory  assumes  that  they  are  sticky.  Consider  a  small  open  economy  in 
which  both  foreign  real  GDP  and  the  foreign  real  interest  rate  are  assumed  to  be 
exogenous, and the domestic real interest rate is pre-determined by the real interest 
rate parity condition. 
The current account of a country is equal to the gap between domestic savings and 
domestic investments as shown by the following equation: 
 
 
* ( , ) ( ) ( , , ) S y r I r CA e y y - = ,  (1) 
 
where S is domestic saving (the sum of private and government saving), I is domestic 
investment (the sum of private and government investment), CA is the current account, 
y is the real GDP of the home country, y* is the real GDP of rest of the world (the United 
States), r is the real interest rate, and e is the (real effective) exchange rate. 
In the neo-classical model, the assumption of flexible prices requires that the real 
GDP of the home country (y) be determined by fully employed factors of production. 
Both the real GDP of the United States (y*) and the real interest rate (r) are regarded as 
exogenous for the small open economy of the home country. Accordingly, the real GDP of 
the home country (y) and the real interest rate (r) determine both domestic savings and 
investment, or the saving-investment gap, in advance. Then, the current account is 
determined at a level that equals the saving-investment gap. Finally, the real effective 
exchange rate (e) assumes a value that matches the current account (CA) with the 
saving-investment gap (S-I) as shown in equation (2): 
 
 
* ( , ) ( ) ( , , ) S y r I r CA e y y - = ,  (2) 
 
where a bar (x ) over a variable indicates that it is regarded as predetermined in the 
model.   
In the Keynesian model, both the real GDP of the United States (y*) and the real 
interest rate (r) are also regarded as given for the small open economy. At first, domestic   4
investment is fixed by the pre-determined real interest rate (r),   
 
 
* ( , ) ( ) ( , , ) S y r I r CA e y y - = .  (3) 
 
The assumption of sticky prices leaves room for demand factors to affect the real 
GDP (y) and current account (CA) of the home country. Indeed, both the real GDP of the 
home country (y) and the real effective exchange rate (e) are simultaneously determined 
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The  “saving  glut”  argument  relies  on  the  neo-classical  model  where 
saving-investment gaps are determined independently of exchange rate fluctuations. It 
is not the exchange rate but the saving-investment balance that determines a current 
account  imbalance.  Exchange  rates  adjust  current  account  imbalances  to  meet  the 
predetermined  saving-investment  balance.  Based  on  this  argument,  the  currency 
revaluation  in  China  and  other  East  Asian  countries  would  not  be  effective  for 
improving the U.S. current account deficit. 
In the Keynesian model, there is room for exchange rates to affect current accounts. 
The saving-investment balance is not pre-determined irrespective of exchange rates 
adjustments. As such, East Asian countries may well be requested to revalue their 
currencies.   
Therefore, the “saving glut” argument and the request for a revaluation of East 




3.  Determinants of the Current accounts of East Asian Countries 
(1) Structural VAR Models for the Current Account   5
In  this  section,  we  build  up  structural  VAR  models  with  contemporaneous 
restrictions based on the neo-classical and Keynesian models described in the previous 
section.5   
The estimation structure is as follows. Let  t Y   be an  1 ´ n   vector of variables and 
t u   be an  1 ´ n   vector of mean zero structural innovations. The pth order structural 
VAR is written as: 
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pL B L B L B B L B - - - - = L   0 B   is  a  non-singular  matrix  summarizes  the 
contemporaneous  relationships  between  the  variables  of  the  model  and  is  most 
commonly where identification restrictions are imposed. 
Associated with the structural model is the reduced form VAR representation: 
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From  the  above,  the  relationship  between  the  reduced  form  and  the  structural 
model can be expressed as: 





- - = S B D B                                                                                                                
      To estimate the structural VAR model requires that the model be either exactly 
identified or over-identified. A necessary condition for the model to be exactly identified 
is that there must be the same number of parameters in  0 B   and  D   as there are in  S , 
of  which  there  are  2 / ) 1 ( + n n   parameters.  It  is  standard  in  the  SVAR  literature  to 
restrict  D   to be diagonal, imposing  ) 1 ( - n n   restrictions. We hence require a further 
                                                   
5  For  more  detail  on  structural  VAR  estimations,  see  Blanchard  and  Quah  (1989), 
Christiano,  Eichenbaum,  and  Evans  (1999,  2005),  Debla-Norris  and  Floerkemeier 
(2006), Mio (2002) and Jang and Ogaki (2004).   6
2 / ) 1 ( - n n   restrictions  on  0 B .  This  can  be  accomplished  by  assuming  that  0 B   is 
lower triangular; that is the standard recursive constraint which we employed in this 
paper. 
      It is noted, however, that the estimation results using the recursive constraint are 
sensitive to an ordering of the variables in the VAR. Therefore, we estimate two VAR 
models  with  contemporaneous  restrictions  consistent  with  the  neo-classical  and 
Keynesian models to check the robustness of regression results.6   
In the VAR specification,  t Y   is a vector of five endogenous variables: the real GDP of 
the home country (y), the real GDP of the United States (y*), the real interest rate (r), 
the real effective exchange rate for the home currency (e), and the current account in 
terms of the GDP of the home country (CA). 
In the neo-classical model, the order of the endogenous variables is written as 
. ] , , , , [
' * e CA y r y Yt =                                                                                                              
The real GDP of the home country (y), the real GDP of the United States (y*), and 
the  real  interest  rate  (r)  are  ordered  before  the  current  account  (CA)  and  the  real 
effective exchange rate (e) because the first three variables contemporaneously affect 
the current account (CA) and the real effective exchange rate (e), rather than the other 
way around. 
In contrast, in the Keynesian model, the order of variables is written as 
. ] , , , , [
' * CA y e r y Yt =                           
The  real  GDP  of  the  United  States  (y*)  and  the  real  interest  rate  (r)  are 
pre-determined  as  before.  Although the  real  GDP  of  home  country  (y)  and  the  real 
effective exchange rate (e) are simultaneously determined, we arrange the order so that 
the real effective exchange rate (e) simultaneously affects the real GDP (y) and the 
current account (CA), but not the reverse. Such ordering allows us to assess whether 
the order of the endogenous variables leads to different results for the neo-classical and 
Keynesian models.   
We estimate parameters of the VAR models for both the neo-classical and Keynesian 
models and analyze the impulse responses of the current account of each East Asian 
country to an exchange rate shock, a domestic GDP shock, and a U.S. GDP shock. 
Furthermore,  we  examine  the  degree  to  which  fluctuations  of  current  accounts  are 
explained by each shock using the forecast error variance decomposition. 
                                                   
6  We do not aim to assess which model can better explain the data between the 
neo-classical and Keynesian models.   7
The  sample  countries  include  China,  Japan,  Korea,  Singapore,  Malaysia,  the 
Philippines,  Indonesia,  and  Thailand.  The  sample  period  covers  from  1994:Q1  to 
2006:Q4. 
We use quarterly data for the relevant economic variables. Data on real effective 
exchange rates are available from the effective exchange rate indices of the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS) (http://www.bis.org/statistics/eer/index.htm). Data on 
current accounts, GDP, interest rates and Consumer Price Index (CPI) are obtained 
from the IMF, International Financial Statistics. Long-term government bond yields are 
collected to create real interest rates for the sample countries except for China (bank 
lending rates) and Indonesia (three-month deposit rates). Chinese CPI is calculated 
(December 2000=100) based on rates of change in the CPI that are obtained from the 
China Statistical Yearbook of the National Bureau of Statistics. Only annual data are 
available for Chinese and Malaysian current accounts and Singapore’s GDP. We use 
cubic spline interpolation to convert them from annual to quarterly data. For real GDP 
(seasonally adjusted), the Hodrick-Prescott filter is used to extract cyclical movements 
around the trend. 
Due to the HP filtering, both the logarithm of the real GDP of home countries (y) and 
the logarithm of the real GDP of the United States (y*) are stationary. The real interest 
rates (r) are also found stationary. The current account (CA) in terms of GDP and the 
logarithm of the real effective exchange rate (e) are non-stationary for most sample 
countries. 
It is controversial whether to difference or not to difference the nonstationary series 
in characterizing the dynamics in terms of a vector autoregression. In this paper, we 
estimate VAR in levels to compare the regression results among the sample countries. 
Hamilton (1994, pp. 651-652) describes several reasons that not to difference is to be 
recommended. First, the parameters that describe the system’s dynamics are estimated 
consistently. Second, even if the true model is a VAR in differences, certain functions of 
the parameters and hypothesis based on a VAR in levels have the same asymptotic 
distribution as would estimates based on differenced data.7 
 
(2) Impulse Responses of Current Accounts to Shocks 
                                                   
7  Another approach is to test each series individually for unit roots and then test for 
possible cointegration among the series. Once the cointegration relationship is found, a 
stationary representation such as a vector error-correction representation can be 
estimated. The disadvantage of this approach is that, despite the care one exercises, the 
restrictions imposed may still be invalid. Moreover, alternative tests for unit roots and 
cointegration can produce conflicting results, and the investigator may be unsure as to 
which should be followed.   8
The panels in Figure 2 show the current accounts and real effective exchange rates 
of China, Japan, Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand. 
Comparisons between current accounts and real effective exchange rates for all of the 
countries show, in general, a negative correlation between them. This means that an 
appreciation of the home currency is related with a decrease in its current account. 
The panels in Figure 3 show the accumulated impulse responses of current accounts 
to shocks (one standard deviation innovations) in the five economic variables (real GDP 
of home country (y), real GDP of the United States (y*), real interest rate (r), real 
effective exchange rate (e), and current account (CA)) for both the neo-classical and 
Keynesian models. In addition, Figure 3 shows a variance decomposition of the current 
accounts into the five economic variables (real GDP of home country (y), real GDP of the 
United States (y*), real interest rate (r), real effective exchange rate (e), and current 
account (CA)) for both the neo-classical and Keynesian models. 
The impulse responses of the current accounts, shown in Figure 3, show how the 
current  account  of  each  of  the  countries  reacts  to  shocks  according  to  both  the 
neo-classical and Keynesian models. Here we focus especially on the impulse responses 
of current accounts to shocks in the real GDP of the home country, the real GDP of the 
United States, and the real effective exchange rate of the home currency. The real GDP 
of the home country is expected to have a positive effect on its current account because 
an increase in real GDP increases savings and, in turn, the saving-investment gap, that 
is the current account. The real GDP of the United States is expected to have a positive 
effect on the current account of the home country because an increase in U.S. GDP 
increases the exports of the home country and, in turn, its GDP. The real effective 
exchange rate of the home currency is expected to have a negative effect on the current 
account of the home country given that an increase in the real effective exchange rate 
means an appreciation of the relevant currency. 
In the case of China, in both models domestic GDP has a positive effect on the 
Chinese current account while U.S. GDP has a negative effect after having no effect for 
the first three quarters. The real effective exchange rate of the Chinese yuan has a 
negative effect on the Chinese current account in both models. Both the positive effect of 
Chinese  GDP  and  the  negative  effect  of  the  exchange  rate  on  the  current  account 
coincide with the results predicted by the theoretical models, although the negative 
effect of U.S. GDP on the Chinese current account is not expected. 
In the case of Japan, domestic GDP has a positive effect on the Japanese current 
account  after  two  years  while  U.S.  GDP  has  a  small positive  effect  on  the  current 
account during the first two years in both the models. The real effective exchange rate of   9
the  Japanese  yen  has  a  negative  effect  on  the Japanese  current  account.  Both  the 
positive effect of Japanese GDP after two years and the negative effect of the exchange 
rate on the current account are the same as those predicted by the theoretical models. 
The small positive effect of U.S. GDP on the current account during the first two years 
is also an expected result. 
In  the  case  of  Korea,  in  both  models,  while  domestic  GDP  and  U.S.  GDP  have 
positive effects on the Korean current account, the real effective exchange rate of the 
Korean  won  has  a  negative  effect.  These  impulse  responses  are  the  same  as  those 
predicted by the theoretical models. 
In  the  case  of  Singapore,  domestic  GDP  has  a  small  positive  effect  on  the 
Singaporean current account while U.S. GDP has a negative effect after having no effect 
for the first three quarters in both of the neo-classical and Keynesian models. The real 
effective exchange rate of the Singapore dollar has a negative effect on the current 
account in both models. Both the positive effect of Singaporean GDP and the negative 
effect of the exchange rate on the current account are the same as the results expected 
in  the  theoretical  models,  although  the  negative  effect  of  U.S.  GDP  on  the  current 
account is not the same as the expected result. 
In  the  case  of  Malaysia,  domestic  GDP  has  a  positive  effect  on  the  Malaysian 
current account in the neo-classical model but little effect on the current account in the 
Keynesian model. U.S. GDP and the real effective exchange rate have a negative effect 
on the Malaysian current account in both models. The positive effect of domestic GDP 
for the neo-classical model and the negative effect of the real effective exchange rate are 
expected. The effect of U.S. GDP on the current account, however, differs from the 
predictions of the theoretical models. 
In the case of the Philippines, although domestic GDP has a negative effect on the 
current account, U.S. GDP has a positive effect for the first four years. The real effective 
exchange rate has a negative effect on the current account. Both the positive effect of 
U.S. GDP and the negative effect of the exchange rate match the expected effects of the 
theoretical  models.  The  negative  effect  of  domestic  GDP  on  the  current  account  is, 
however, not an expected result. 
In the case of Indonesia, domestic GDP and U.S. GDP have positive effects, and the 
real  effective  exchange  rate  of  the  Indonesian  rupiah  has  a  negative  effect  on  the 
current  account  in  both  models.  These  impulse  responses  are  the  same  as  those 
predicted by the theoretical models. 
In the case of Thailand, both Thai and U.S. GDP have a positive effect on the Thai 
current account in the two models. The real effective exchange rate of the Thai baht has   10
a negative effect on the current account. These impulse responses are the same as those 
anticipated by the theoretical models. 
All of the impulse responses are the same as those predicted by the theoretical 
models for Korea, Indonesia, and Thailand. On the other hand, both the positive effect 
of domestic GDP and the negative effect of the exchange rate on the current account are 
the same as expected in the theoretical models, although the negative effect of U.S. GDP 
on  the  current  account  is  not  the  same  as  the  result  expected  for  Japan,  China, 
Singapore,  and  Malaysia.  Moreover,  both  the  positive  effect  of  U.S.  GDP  and  the 
negative effect of the exchange rate on the current account are the same as expected in 
the theoretical models although the negative effect of domestic GDP on the current 
account is not the same as the result as expected for the Philippines.8 
 
(3) Variance Decomposition of Current Accounts 
Next, variance decomposition is conducted based on the above impulse response 
analysis to investigate the major determinants of current account variation for each 
country using both the neo-classical and Keynesian models. The panels in Figure 3 
show the variance decomposition and the impulse response of the current account for 
each country. 
In  the  case  of  China,  Chinese  GDP  explains  about  20%  of  the  Chinese  current 
account after five quarters in both the neo-classical and Keynesian models. U.S. GDP 
explains about 10% of the current account after two years in both the models. The real 
effective exchange rate explains about 5% to 10% of the current account over time in 
both models. 
In the case of Japan, the real effective exchange rate explains about 35% of the 
Japanese current account after one and half years in the Keynesian model. Japanese 
GDP explains about 20% of the current account after three years later in both the 
models. U.S. GDP explains about 10% of the current account in both the models. 
In the case of Korea, the real effective exchange rate explains about 35% of the 
Korean current account in the Keynesian model. The real interest rate explains about 
35% of the current account in the first half year. After that, it explains about 25% of the 
current account. U.S. GDP explains about 5% of the current account in both of the 
                                                   
8  In the small open economy, the foreign GDP positively influences the home country’s 
current account in the Keynesian framework, but does not in the neo-classical model. 
On the contrary, in two-country model, it is possible that the foreign GDP negatively 
affects the home country’s current account in the neo-classical model. Our regression 
results of the negative foreign GDP effects is consistent with the two-country mode, 
suggesting that the countries such as Japan, China and Singapore may not be small 
open economies but large countries like the US.   11
models. 
In the case of Singapore, U.S. GDP explains about 15% of the Singaporean current 
account after one and half years in both the models. Domestic GDP explains about 10% 
of the current account in both the models. The real effective exchange rate explains a 
small part of current account in earlier stages, and about 30% of the current account in 
the 30th quarter. 
In the case of Malaysia, the real effective exchange rate explains 40% to 50% of the 
Malaysian current account in the Keynesian model. Each of Malaysian and U.S. GDP 
each explain no more than 10% of the current account in both models. 
In the case of the Philippines, U.S. GDP explains about 15% of Philippine current 
account in both the models. Domestic GDP explains about 5% of the current account. 
The real effective exchange rate explains about 20% of the current account after three 
years in both models.   
In the case of Indonesia, the real effective exchange rate explains about 20% of the 
Indonesian current account after a half of year in the Keynesian model. In addition, the 
real interest rate explains about 20% of the current account in both models. U.S. GDP 
and Indonesian GDP each explain about 10% of the current account. 
In the case of Thailand, the real effective exchange rate explains about 40% of the 
Thai current account after a half a year in the Keynesian model. The real interest rate 
explains about 15% of the current account in both models. U.S. GDP explains about 15% 
of the current account in the first quarter but only about 5% of the current account after 
one year. Thai GDP explains about 5% of the current account in both models. 
In sum, the East Asian countries can be classified into three groups. The first group, 
which includes Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand, consists of countries 
for which the real effective exchange rate is a major determinant of the current account. 
U.S. GDP has a relatively small effect on the current accounts of these countries. The 
second group, which includes Singapore and the Philippines, consists of countries where 
U.S. GDP is a major determinant of the current account in earlier stages and the real 
effective exchange rate is a major determinant in later stages. For the last group, which 
only includes China, domestic GDP is a major determinant of the current account. 
China is the only country for which domestic GDP or aggregate domestic demand is 
a major determinant of the current account. For the other East Asian countries, it is the 
exchange  rate,  rather  than  domestic  or  U.S.  GDP,  that  contributes  to  the  current 
account.  The  Chinese  determination  of  the  current  account  corresponds  to  the 
neo-classical model in which domestic GDP, U.S. GDP, and the real interest rate are 
pre-determined before the exchange rate changes to adjust the current account. On the   12
other hand, the determination of the current accounts of the other East Asian countries 
corresponds to the Keynesian model in which U.S. GDP and the real interest rate are 
pre-determined before the exchange rate changes to adjust the current account. This is 
followed by an adjustment in the GDP of the home country.   
As explained in section 2, the “saving glut” argument relies on the neo-classical 
model  while  the  request  to  revalue  currencies  relies  on  the  Keynesian  model. 
Accordingly, the Chinese current account surplus can be associated with the “saving 
glut” argument because it is mainly determined by Chinese GDP, or aggregate domestic 
demand.  Therefore,  a  “saving  glut”  in  China  is  responsible  for  the  current  account 
surplus  of  China.  On  the  other  hand,  a  revaluation  of  the  Chinese  yuan  would 
contribute little to the reduction of this surplus. 
The current accounts of the other East Asian countries are well explained by the 
Keynesian model, which the request to revalue or appreciate currencies, not the “saving 
glut argument”, relies on. The current account surpluses of these countries are not 
caused  by  excess  savings  but  rather  undervalued  currencies.  Revaluation  or 
appreciation of currencies should contribute to a reduction of current account surpluses. 
Our finding that the real efficient exchange rate is a major determinant of the current 
account  in  all  of  the  sample  countries,  with  the  exception  of  China,  provides  clear 
evidence that a revaluation or appreciation of currencies should reduce the current 
account  surpluses  of  these  countries.  Thus,  policy-makers  should  adopt  different 




4.  Effects of the Chinese Yuan Revaluation on the Current Accounts of Other East 
Asian Countries 
In  spite  of  the  small  reduction  in  the  Chinese  current  account  surplus  that  a 
revaluation might achieve, a revaluation of the Chinese yuan has been requested by the 
governments of many countries, including the United State and the European Union 
(EU). Supposing that the Chinese government accomplished a significant revaluation of 
the Chinese yuan we investigate what effects a revaluation would have on the current 
accounts of other East Asian countries. 
For this purpose, the Keynesian model is used to analyze how the current account of 
each of the East Asian countries reacts to a revaluation of the Chinese yuan, given that 
the  current  accounts  of  these  countries  should  be  well  explained  by  the  Keynesian 
model. Both three-variable and five-variable VAR models are used for the analysis. The   13
three-variable VAR model includes the real effective exchange rate of the home currency 
(e), the current account in terms of domestic GDP (CA), and the real effective exchange 
rate  of  the  Chinese  yuan  (e*)  as  endogenous  variables.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
five-variable VAR model includes as endogenous variables both real domestic GDP (y) 
and Chinese GDP (y*), the real effective exchange rates of the home currency (e) and the 
Chinese yuan (e*), and the current account in terms of domestic GDP (CA). 
The real effective exchange rates of the home currency and the Chinese yuan and 
the GDPs of the home country and China as well as the current account are regarded 
as endogenous variables in the five-variable VAR model. In contrast, only the real 
effective exchange rates of the home currency and the Chinese yuan and the current 
account are regarded as endogenous variables while the GDPs of home country and 
China  are  regarded  as  exogenous  variables  in  the  three-variable  VAR  model. 
Accordingly, while the three-variable VAR model supposes that a Chinese yuan shock 
will have a direct effect on the current account of the home country, the five-variable 
VAR model supposes that in addition to the direct effect there will be an indirect effect 
through the GDPs of the home country and China. The direct effect is closely related to 
whether the trade structure of the home country is a substitute or complement of that 
of the Chinese economy. 
The estimated three-variable and five-variable VAR models are used to analyze the 
impulse responses of the current accounts of East Asian countries to a real effective 
exchange rate shock in the Chinese yuan. The sample period covers from 1994:Q1 to 
2006:Q4. 
The  real  effective  exchange  rate  for  the  home  currency  is  expected  to  have  a 
negative effect on the current account of the home country in the three-variable VAR 
model. The real effective exchange rate for the Chinese yuan is expected to have a 
positive direct effect on the current account of the home country if the trade structures 
of China and other East Asian countries are substitutes. On the other hand, the real 
effective exchange rate of the Chinese yuan is expected to have a negative direct effect 
on the current account of the home country if trade structures are complements. 
The indirect effect of the Chinese yuan on the current account of the home country 
in the five-variable VAR can be explained as follows. Supposed that trade structures of 
the home country and China are substitutes. A revaluation of the Chinese yuan (an 
increase in the real effective exchange rate of the Chinese yuan) induces a demand shift 
from Chinese products to home products. This shift increases the GDP of the home 
country and, at the same time, decreases Chinese GDP In turn, home imports increase 
(caused by the increase in GDP of home country) and home exports decrease (caused by   14
the decrease in Chinese GDP. Thus, the real effective exchange rate of the Chinese yuan 
has a negative indirect effect on the current account of the home country in the case 
where trade structures are substitutes. Accordingly, the total effect of the real effective 
exchange rate of the Chinese yuan on the current account is the sum of the positive 
direct effect and the negative indirect effect in the five-variable VAR model. The sign of 
the total effect will depend on which is larger, the direct or the indirect effect. 
The  panels  in  Figure  4  show  the  accumulated  impulse  responses  of  the  three 
economic variables (both the real effective exchange rates of home currency (e) and the 
Chinese yuan (e*) and the current account in terms of GDP of the home country (CA)) to 
a shock (one standard deviation innovations) of the real effective exchange rates of the 
Chinese yuan (e*) for each of the sample countries. The panels in Figure 5 show the 
accumulated impulse responses of the five economic variables (both the real effective 
exchange rates of home currency (e) and the Chinese yuan (e*), both GDPs of home 
country  (y)  and  China  (y*),  and  the  current  account  in  terms  of  the  GDP  of  home 
country  (CA))  to  a  shock  (one  standard  deviation  innovations)  in  the  real  effective 
exchange rate of the Chinese yuan (e*).   
The three-variable VAR analyses have the following analytical results. The real 
effective exchange rate of the home currency has a negative effect on current account of 
the home country for all of the sample countries. The real effective exchange rate of the 
Chinese yuan has a positive direct effect on the current account of the home country for 
all of the sample countries except for the Philippines. The accumulated response of the 
Philippine current account to the Chinese yuan shock is small and fluctuates as time 
passes. Thus, the Chinese yuan revaluation improves the current account of all other 
East Asian countries with the exception of the Philippines. This evidence implies that 
the countries’ have trade structures that are substitutes with the trade structure of 
China. 
We obtain the following analytical results for the five-variable VAR model. The real 
effective  exchange  rate  of  the  home  currency  has  a  negative  effect  on  the  current 
account of the home country for all of the sample countries. The real effective exchange 
rate of the Chinese yuan has a positive total effect on the current account of the home 
country  for  Japan,  Korea,  Indonesia,  and  Thailand.  In  contrast,  the  real  effective 
exchange rate for the Chinese yuan has a negative total effect on the current account of 
the  home  country  for  Singapore  and  Malaysia.  The  accumulated  response  of  the 
Philippine current account to the Chinese yuan shock is small and fluctuates as time 
passes. Thus, the Chinese yuan revaluation improves the current accounts of Japan, 
Korea,  Indonesia,  and  Thailand.  This  evidence  implies  that  the  countries’  trade   15
structures are substitutable with that of China. On the other hand, the Chinese yuan 
revaluation deteriorates the current accounts of Singapore and Malaysia because the 
negative indirect effect through GDP is larger than the direct effect. 
In sum, the results of the five-variable VAR analysis show that a revaluation of the 
Chinese yuan would improve the current accounts of other East Asian countries which 
include Japan, Korea, Indonesia, and Thailand. The major countries of East Asia such 
as Japan and Korea and some ASEAN member countries would see an improvement in   
their current accounts as a result of a revaluation of the Chinese yuan. 
 
 
5.  Conclusion 
This paper uses structural VAR models with contemporaneous restrictions based on 
the neo-classical and Keynesian theories to analyze the determinants of the current 
accounts  of  East  Asian  countries.  In  particular,  we  investigate  whether  currency 
revaluation contributes to a reduction in the current account imbalance. The analytical 
results suggest that China is the only country for which domestic GDP, or aggregate 
domestic demand, is a major determinant of the current account while it is the exchange 
rate, rather than domestic GDP or U. S. GDP that contributes to the current accounts of 
other East Asian countries. 
A comparison between the neo-classical and Keynesian models shows that Chinese 
GDP, or aggregate domestic demand, mainly determines the Chinese current account. 
Therefore, the “saving glut” in China is responsible for the current account surplus of 
China. On the other hand, a revaluation of the Chinese yuan would probably contribute 
little to a reduction of the current account surplus of China. In contrast, the current 
accounts of the other East Asian countries are well explained by the Keynesian model, 
and it is this model that the request for a revaluation or appreciation of currencies relies 
on.  The  “saving  glut”  argument  relies  on  the  neoclassical  model.  A  revaluation  or 
appreciation  of  currencies  should  contribute  to  a  reduction  in  the  current  account 
surpluses of the other East Asian countries.   
In addition, three-variable and five-variable VAR models, which include the real 
effective exchange rate of the home currency and the Chinese yuan, and the current 
account in terms of domestic GDP are used to investigate whether a revaluation of the 
Chinese  yuan  improves  or  deteriorates  the  current  accounts  or  saving-investments 
balance of other East Asian countries. The analytical results show that a revaluation of 
the  Chinese  yuan  improves  the  current  accounts  of  Japan,  Korea,  Indonesia,  and 
Thailand. In other words, the current accounts of major countries in East Asia, for   16
example, Japan and Korea, and several ASEAN member countries such as Thailand 
and Indonesia, increase in response to a revaluation of the Chinese yuan. 
Thus, although the U.S. government has requested that the Chinese government 
revalue the Chinese yuan, such a revaluation would have little effect on the Chinese 
current account itself. At the same time, the revaluation would improve the current 
accounts of other major East Asian countries including Japan, Korea, Indonesia, and 
Thailand. Thus, a revaluation of the Chinese yuan would not contribute to a reduction 
in the current account imbalance between the United States and East Asia. In fact, it 
might actually increase this current account imbalance. 
The results have several policy implications for the current account imbalances of 
the Asia-Pacific region. First, if we focus on the current account imbalance of China. 
The  “saving  glut”  in  China  is  responsible  for  the  current  account  surplus,  but  a 
revaluation of the Chinese yuan would have little effect on the current account. The 
Chinese government should stimulate aggregate domestic demand, including domestic 
private consumption and private investment, in order to reduce excess savings in China 
and,  in  turn,  to  reduce  the  Chinese  current  account  surplus.  A  fiscal  expansion 
conducted  by  the  Chinese  government  would  be  effective  for  stimulating  domestic 
demand. In addition, raising minimum wage rates in China might stimulate domestic 
private  consumption.  Moreover,  it  has  been  pointed  out  that  inefficient  financial 
intermediation through domestic financial markets cannot provide a well-functioning 
conduit for domestic savings to flow to domestic investments. 
Second, a revaluation of the Chinese yuan alone would lead to improvements in the 
current accounts of other East Asian countries while having little effect on the Chinese 
current account. Thus, the revaluation might aggravate the current account imbalance 
that exists between the United States and East Asia. It is not only the Chinese yuan but 
also other East Asian currencies that need to be revalued or allowed to appreciate 
against the US dollar in order to reduce the current account imbalance. Coordinated 
exchange rate policy among the East Asian countries is necessary to solve the global 
imbalance. 
Lastly, the U.S. government should reduce its own fiscal deficits to improve the 
saving-investment  imbalance  and,  in  turn,  the  current  account  deficit.  Coordinated 
macroeconomic policy for external adjustments in the Asia-Pacific region, which include 
not only coordinated exchange rate policy in East Asia but also reduced fiscal deficits for 
the U.S. government, are needed to solve the global imbalance. 
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Figure1: Current Account Imbalances between the United States and Asia 
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Fig. 3-1 China
Accumulated Impulse Response of Current Account to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations
Neo-classical Model Keynesian Model
Variance Decomposition of Current Account
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Fig. 3-2 Japan
Accumulated Impulse Response of Current Account to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations
Neo-classical Model Keynesian Model
Variance Decomposition of Current Account
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Fig. 3-3 Korea
Accumulated Impulse Response of Current Account to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations
Neo-classical Model Keynesian Model
Variance Decomposition of Current Account
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Fig. 3-4 Singapore
Accumulated Impulse Response of Current Account to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations
Neo-classical Model Keynesian Model
Variance Decomposition of Current Account
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Fig. 3-5 Malaysia
Accumulated Impulse Response of Current Account to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations
Neo-classical Model Keynesian Model
Variance Decomposition of Current Account
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Fig. 3-6 The Philippines
Accumulated Impulse Response of Current Account to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations
Neo-classical Model Keynesian Model
Variance Decomposition of Current Account
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Fig. 3-7 Indonesia
Accumulated Impulse Response of Current Account to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations
Neo-classical Model Keynesian Model
Variance Decomposition of Current Account
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Fig. 3-8 Thailand
Accumulated Impulse Response of Current Account to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations
Neo-classical Model Keynesian Model
Variance Decomposition of Current Account
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Fig. 4 Three-variable VAR Model
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Fig. 5 Five-variable VAR Model
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